Two Distinct Ontological Actualities, or Epistemilogical?

What we have termed physical is made up of particular properties, just as the mental has a different set of properties. We distinguish the two because they are different in our experience of them. Unfortunately, because the properties of the physical are more present to us, at least from an objective (which I’m defining as a shared subjectivity) standpoint, we have taken them to be more primal or essential than the mental properties. This is why the mind/body problem exists.

The mental isn’t physical and vice versa, but we must recognize that the mental and the physical are just concepts placed upon particular experiences of our reality. The concepts confine the experiences to particular realm, and so we should not attempt to combine the realms (they are distinctive, and its why we use concepts in the first place); but we should acknowledge that our ideas about the differentiation between physical and mental are secondary to the primal reality of their unitary experience. From that unitary perspective, the mental and physical are one, a monistic experience. At the level of pure experience, one cannot separate the mind from the matter. It is only when we begin to describe them that we can denote their differences.

So what does this all mean? Well, for me, I understand this to mean that ultimately, mind and matter are one. We can never separate our felt experience of looking at a tree, and the tree itself. They always show up together in experience.